Is undercover policing worth the risk?

The recently published ‘guidelines’ on police undercover operations prove to be just ‘business as usual’.

The guidelines consist of eighty pages in which a new ‘alphabet soup’ of abbreviations describes each of a set of roles to be fulfilled by officers of given ranks. There are procedures set out for the authorisation of undercover operations and how they are to be managed. There are rules about what is permissible or not, most notably a prohibition on undercover officers forming sexual relationships with those they are spying upon. Although apparently an innovation for undercover operations, this reliance on rules, procedures and structures as a response to scandal is far from new. It gives the appearance of being decisive, but does precious little to prevent such wayward conduct in future.

The guidelines acknowledge that undercover work is sensitive, arduous and potentially dangerous. Nowhere does the report go into any detail of why precisely it is sensitive, arduous and potently dangerous. Its dangers are apparent: because spies risk exposure and might be harmed by those whom they have being spying upon. FBI Special Agent, Joe Pistone (better known by his pseudonym, ‘Donnie Brasco’) penetrated the American mafia in three cities over seven years, resulting in two hundred prosecutions, but all at the tremendous cost of now living in fear of mafia reprisal if his true identity is revealed. A similar fate might befall undercover officers who penetrate serious organised crime groups in the UK. It would certainly have been the fate meted out by terrorists in Northern Ireland who, we are told, were riddled with informers and undercover officers. Being unmasked is a serious risk faced by undercover officers and the guidance is correct in giving it such prominence, but it is not the only danger. Neither is it the danger that prompted the publication of these guidelines. This was quite a different danger, but much more pervasive one and yet it remains wholly unacknowledged in the guidelines.

Joe Pistone makes an interesting revelation in his autobiography of his undercover career. With the mass arrests that concluded Pistone’s undercover operation, his role as an FBI agent was soon revealed. The Mafia responded by swiftly murdering the local boss, Sonny Black, who had sponsored ‘Donnie Brasco’. Pistone tells the reader of his sense of regret, even remorse, about Sonny Black’s murder, for he had enjoyed a close amicable relationship with Black and now he had caused the man’s death. Joe Pistone’s feelings reveal an important truth about undercover operations.

A ubiquitous feature of undercover work is that the officer must get up close and personal with those upon whom they are spying. Being so deeply involved requires that officers adhere to what sociologists call the ‘norm of reciprocity’. If someone is kindly to you, then you are expected to be kindly in return. This norm insinuates itself into the minutiae of everyday life of us all, including the life of a criminal gang or activist cell. But undercover officers will be perpetually conflicted throughout the small niceties of daily life, because they are violating an even more fundamental code of social interaction: they are deceiving others and being inauthentic. This creates what psychologists call ‘cognitive dissonance’, an unpleasant experience that demands a remedy. The easiest resolution is to cease being deceptive and genuinely reciprocate the friendship that others in the group extent to them. Over time this forms a bond, like that between ‘Donnie Brasco’ and Sonny Black. Indeed, the pressures of the ‘norm of reciprocity’ and ‘cognitive dissonance’ are so unrelenting that it is difficult to imagine how any undercover officer can withstand them.

Activist groups present a particularly seductive milieu for promoting identification. They are composed of ‘true believers’, eager to convince others of the truth that has been revealed to them. Often they feel beleaguered, a sense of threat that binds them closely together. Of course, they fear infiltration, and so any newcomer will need to establish the strength of their commitment, but an undercover agent will need to work especially hard at doing so. In order to accomplish this they must necessarily empathise with activists. They must laugh at the same jokes, regret the same setbacks, and celebrate the same ‘victories.’ Most of all, they must share the same beliefs. As they do so they might find that the activists ‘have a point’ and that stereotypes are misleading. It is easy to imagine how, under these circumstances, an undercover officer might form a bond with an attractive member of the group that matures into a sexual relationship. Certainly, rules, procedures and structures could not hope to prevent it.

All this might be a price worth paying if there is no alternative and the criminality is sufficiently serious, but this is hardly the case with small bands of political activists. I don’t minimise the threat that might emerge from such groups. They might aspire to damage coal–fired electricity generators and thereby inflict considerable damage, but more seriously they could jeopardise future investment in electricity generation by the firms upon which we all rely. But is undercover infiltration necessary to discover what the ambitions of such groups are? There is considerable open–source intelligence available about activist strategy and tactics that could inform policing at no risk at all. Activist groups are also extremely leaky: they publish promotional literature boasting of their achievements. They are neither agents of foreign states nor violent criminal gangs, because they reach out to attract new members. As true believers anxious to propagate the faith to the idly curious, this allows even an officer in full uniform to discover almost everything the police need to know, just ask them!

If the pickings from undercover surveillance are meagre, the costs to the police are considerable. The police can only operate if the public grants them the legitimacy to do so. Undercover policing has resulted in self–inflicted wounds to that legitimacy since Sergeant Popay infiltrated a subversive political group in 1833. It has periodically erupted ever since. Perhaps it is time for the police to learn of its dangers. Hopefully, mature reflection might encourage greater caution in using such tactics in future.

Featured image credit: “Police”, by Chris. CC by 2.0 via Flickr.