Comments on: Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/ Academic insights for the thinking world. Thu, 23 May 2013 12:47:31 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.4.2 By: Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact | OUPblog http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-404046 Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact | OUPblog Wed, 08 May 2013 23:52:00 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-404046 [...] COIN supporters, both within the military and beyond, may yet make a case that counterinsurgency methods represent a viable political-military tool that can contribute to a broader strategy to support regimes in which the United States has a vital interest. But the argument should not rest on eliding the complexities of the wars in which COIN methods have been tried or on overlooking the much more direct contribution of a binding security partnership. Andrew J. Polsky is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center. A former editor of the journal Polity, his most recent book is Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy” and “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs.” [...] [...] COIN supporters, both within the military and beyond, may yet make a case that counterinsurgency methods represent a viable political-military tool that can contribute to a broader strategy to support regimes in which the United States has a vital interest. But the argument should not rest on eliding the complexities of the wars in which COIN methods have been tried or on overlooking the much more direct contribution of a binding security partnership. Andrew J. Polsky is Professor of Political Science at Hunter College and the CUNY Graduate Center. A former editor of the journal Polity, his most recent book is Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy” and “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs.” [...]

]]> By: The Wartime Presidency | OUPblog http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-404042 The Wartime Presidency | OUPblog Wed, 08 May 2013 23:49:55 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-404042 [...] Presidency at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy,” “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs,” “Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact,” “To be Commander-in-Chief,” and “Presidents, [...] [...] Presidency at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy,” “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs,” “Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact,” “To be Commander-in-Chief,” and “Presidents, [...]

]]> By: Presidents, protest, and patriotism | OUPblog http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-404040 Presidents, protest, and patriotism | OUPblog Wed, 08 May 2013 23:49:37 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-404040 [...] at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy,” “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs,” “Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact,” and “To be [...] [...] at War. Read his previous blog posts: “Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy,” “Mitt Romney as Commander in Chief: some troubling signs,” “Muddling counterinsurgency’s impact,” and “To be [...]

]]> By: OUPblog » Blog Archive » The great silence: Afghanistan in the presidential campaigns http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-286684 OUPblog » Blog Archive » The great silence: Afghanistan in the presidential campaigns Tue, 14 Aug 2012 12:30:50 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-286684 [...] by dwelling on his position. (And, for that matter, it isn’t clear what Romney’s stance is, as I’ve noted.) Indeed, to speak about war could easily cost Obama or Romney [...] [...] by dwelling on his position. (And, for that matter, it isn’t clear what Romney’s stance is, as I’ve noted.) Indeed, to speak about war could easily cost Obama or Romney [...]

]]> By: OUPblog » Blog Archive » Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-276844 OUPblog » Blog Archive » Obama v. Romney on Afganistan strategy Wed, 23 May 2012 14:30:22 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-276844 [...] when asked about his policy on Afghanistan, Republican presidential-nominee-in-waiting Mitt Romney said he would wait until he had spoken to his military commanders before deciding on a timetable to withdraw American [...] [...] when asked about his policy on Afghanistan, Republican presidential-nominee-in-waiting Mitt Romney said he would wait until he had spoken to his military commanders before deciding on a timetable to withdraw American [...]

]]> By: Stephen Burleson http://blog.oup.com/2012/05/romney-commander-in-chief-military-war-polsky/#comment-274117 Stephen Burleson Mon, 07 May 2012 16:26:39 +0000 http://blog.oup.com/?p=24257#comment-274117 You're right - perceptions are important. Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait partly because U.S. ambassador April Glaspie gave him the impression the U.S. would not intervene. A similar misperception helped launch the Korean War. Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy encouraged German aggression leading up to WWII. Perhaps Mr. Romney has simply determined that a tough position is more effective than a soft one when dealing with adversaries. Also, it would be far better for Mr. Romney's team to develop a comprehensive foreign/military policy, and work the Afghanistan withdrawal into it, than the other way around. He may not be quite ready to discuss this yet. You’re right – perceptions are important. Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait partly because U.S. ambassador April Glaspie gave him the impression the U.S. would not intervene. A similar misperception helped launch the Korean War. Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement policy encouraged German aggression leading up to WWII.

Perhaps Mr. Romney has simply determined that a tough position is more effective than a soft one when dealing with adversaries.

Also, it would be far better for Mr. Romney’s team to develop a comprehensive foreign/military policy, and work the Afghanistan withdrawal into it, than the other way around. He may not be quite ready to discuss this yet.

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